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Final Thoughts

  • Siegfried O. Wolf
Chapter
Part of the Contemporary South Asian Studies book series (CSAS)

Abstract

This concluding chapter states that an assessment of the initial planning process (2013–2015) and most of the official first phase (2015–2020) of the CPEC’s implementation (especially the ‘Early Harvest Projects’) reveals clear indications that this development initiative will not function as a ‘game changer’ or ‘critical juncture’ for Pakistan’s economy and regional cooperation. In contrast to official proclamations, the CPEC project is accompanied by severe ramifications in all spheres of state and society, including economic, political, social and environmental aspects. Despite the fact that the CPEC implementation is still in an early phase—making a final evaluation premature—it can be stated that the stringent application of the newly developed concept of Economic Corridors offers a fruitful approach for the analysis of the CPEC—making comprehensive findings possible.

An assessment of the initial planning process (2013–2015) and most of the official first phase (2015–2020) of the CPEC’s implementation (especially the ‘Early Harvest Projects’), reveals clear indications that this development initiative will not function as a ‘game changer’ or ‘critical juncture’ for Pakistan’s economy and regional cooperation. In contrast to official proclamations, the CPEC project is accompanied by severe negative ramifications in all spheres of state and society, including economic, political, social and environmental aspects. Despite the fact that the CPEC implementation is still in an initial phase—making a final evaluation premature—the following key findings can be presented.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Siegfried O. Wolf
    • 1
  1. 1.South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF)BrusselsBelgium

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