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Philosophical Scepticism and Its Arguments for Relativism

  • Stuart Sim
Chapter

Abstract

Philosophers from classical times onwards have debated the nature of truth and whether it should be defined as absolute or relative. If truth is relative, then the problem arises as to how we can ever justify our value judgements. The arguments put forward for relativism by philosophical sceptics are discussed here, to see whether these make it difficult to judge the claims of the post-truth camp. Various theories of truth are examined, with Bayesian analysis, which deals in probabilities instead of truths, being suggested as a way of making value judgements even in the absence of any absolute concept of truth. Bayesian analysis is a matter of ‘informed guessing’, and fuzzy logic works in a similar manner. The conclusion to be drawn is that truth is a matter of evidence rather than logical deduction, and that post-truth will always be unconvincing on that score.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stuart Sim
    • 1
  1. 1.Newcastle upon TyneUK

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