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Weyl, Identity, Indiscernibility, Realism

  • Otávio Bueno
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 406)

Abstract

In this paper, I reconstruct a technique originally formulated by Hermann Weyl to accommodate, in the foundations of quantum mechanics, aggregates of quantum particles despite these particles’ apparent lack of identity. I defend the importance of this technique and provide a slight variant of Weyl’s original formulation by avoiding altogether the use of set theory. I then offer formulations of individuals and non-individuals, inspired by considerations that Weyl made in the context of his theory of aggregates, and examine the status of non-individuals with regard to debates about realism. I conclude that there is still much to be learned from careful study of Weyl’s work.

Keywords

Weyl Identity Indiscernibility Individual Non-individual Realism 

Notes

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to Jonas Arenhart, Chris De Ronde, Steven French, Roman Frigg, Roberto Giuntini, Miklós Redéi, Bryan Roberts, Simon Saunders, and especially Décio Krause, for extremely helpful discussions about the issues examined in this paper. Many thanks are also due to Alberto Cordero for his support and patience throughout the process of writing and completing this work.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Otávio Bueno
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesUSA

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