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Structural Realism and the Standard Model

  • Steven FrenchEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 406)

Abstract

The Standard Model of elementary particle physics is one of the best theories that we currently have and thereby invites realist engagement. Adopting a realist stance towards it involves careful consideration of the nature of the symmetries that it incorporates. Here I begin with such a consideration and argue that it leads us to a form of structural realism that, following Cassirer might be called ‘Parmenidean’. I conclude with some thoughts on how this meshes with ‘local’ forms of realism.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyReligion and History of Science, University of LeedsLeedsUK

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