An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory

  • Motsamai MolefeEmail author


In this chapter, Molefe elaborates the idea of personhood as a moral theory. He conducts this discussion in a three-fold manner: Molefe begins by clarifying the relationship between being human and being a person; three such relationships are discussed. Next, he considers the agent-centred (character-based) nature of this moral theory. Two implications are drawn from the character-based nature of the discourse of personhood: (1) the meta-ethical view of humanism and (2) moral individualism. Finally, Molefe considers the role of social relationships in the moral discourse on personhood. He concludes by interpreting personhood to be a deontological egoistic perfectionist moral theory.


Egoism Humanism Individualism Perfectionism Personhood Social relationships 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of the WitwatersrandJohannesburgSouth Africa

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