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The Relational Economics: An Example of Substantial Hypothesis Refutation

  • Alain HerscoviciEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Various studies on the economics of information conducted from the perspective developed by Akerlof, Grossman, and Stiglitz support the claim that the signal provided by the market price system is incomplete. It is from this price opacity that agents will develop opportunistic behaviors, as it becomes impossible to observe certain qualitative variables. I will show how and from what conditions information asymmetries explain (a) the instability of competition equilibrium and (b) the cumulative nature of the cycle from certain demand externalities.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidade Federal do Espírito SantoVitóriaBrazil

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