Cooperation, Interaction and Fusion of Transnational Organised Crime and Transnational Jihadism: The New Terrorism

  • Stefan Goertz
  • Alexander E. Streitparth


This chapter explains that transnational organised crime and international Jihadism profit significantly from ongoing conflicts, wars and the weakening and failure of governmental structures. The empirical analysis of the interaction, cooperation and partial fusion of actors of (transnational) organised crime and of international Jihadism shows that weak and failed states in conflict areas like North and West Africa, East Africa, the Near and Middle East, the Balkans region, Afghanistan, Caucasus and other regions are crucial for the prosperity of both groups. The analysis of selected hybrid actors indicates a fusion of organised crime and Jihadism on the basis of common features like decentralised networks and cells; local, regional or national political and religious Jihadi agendas; multiple and heterogeneously structured financing activities; and complex member communities which are hard to detect.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Goertz
    • 1
  • Alexander E. Streitparth
    • 2
  1. 1.BundespolizeiHochschule des BundesLübeckGermany
  2. 2.BundeswehrZentrum Operative KommunikationMayenGermany

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