Conclusions: How Can Stability Be Achieved Most Efficiently in Plural Societies?
This project’s quantitative tests of consociational theory provide evidence that highly inclusive coalitions deter violent and nonviolent instability. A positive impact by the other three consociational components could not be confirmed through analysis of this dataset. Factor analysis appears to support Lijphart’s observation that countries using consociational components are not less likely to enjoy stability than other democracies. Case study analysis of seven societies suggests that incentives for intergroup political consideration facilitate the success of consociation and need not be introduced through mechanisms which could permanently exclude potentially antagonistic groups from power. Some such practices are the single transferable vote electoral system, the creation of heterogeneous constituencies, and occasional non-group-related referendums.
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