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Conclusions

  • Shelly GottfriedEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

In order to explain the problematic nature of contemporary political economies this book first conceptualized a prominent and unusually powerful segment of the business community as an oligarchy. Second, it entailed a reconceptualization of oligarchy. More specifically, it argues that an oligarchy is not a formal regime, but an informal political–economic institution. Furthermore, the oligarchy should not be understood in terms of the wealth of its members, but rather through the economic processes and social relationships that allow very few individuals to garner substantial influence on the political economy and its decision makers. It also maintains that the objectives of the oligarchy are not exclusively focused on wealth defense, but mainly on wealth and power accumulation, while hampering economic competition, executed through various social and political means, such as biased credit allocation and regulatory capture.

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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC)City, University of LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Beit Berl CollegeBeit BerlIsrael

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