This chapter focuses on the possibility that some well-known voting procedures are vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox even in preference profiles that are characterized by a restricted domain where a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in each disjoint subset of voters but not in their union. Our focus is on 15 voting procedures known to be vulnerable to the Inconsistency paradox in unrestricted domains. These procedures include 10 Condorcet-consistent and 5 Condorcet-non-consistent rules. The former are, however, only briefly touched upon because their invulnerability to the Inconsistency paradox in the restricted domain is obvious.
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