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20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Hannu NurmiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Economics book series (BRIEFSECONOMICS)

Abstract

20 voting procedures for electing a single candidate are introduced and briefly commented upon. The procedures fall into three classes in terms of the type of voter input and Condorcet consistency: non-ranked procedures, ranked procedures that are not Condorcet-consistent and ranked ones that are Condorcet-consistent. The first class consists of four procedures, the second consists of seven procedures and the third class consists of nine procedures.

Keywords

Non-ranked voting procedures Ranked procedures Condorcet-consistent procedures 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Political SciencesUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

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