Wynne Godley pp 93-110 | Cite as

Gatecrashing the Cambridge Tradition

  • Alan Shipman


Having shifted focus from short-term forecasts to longer-term analysis in his later Treasury years, Godley accepts an invitation from Kaldor to move to Cambridge as director of its Department of Applied Economics (DAE). He takes over and expands a group of externally funded researchers, set up by Keynes but long divided over the right empirical approach to developing his analysis. Godley sets up the Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG), which within ten years is its largest unit, producing regular policy assessments which gain national publicity for their scathing verdicts on the likely consequences of Conservative and Labour policies through the 1970s. Francis Cripps, recruited to the Economics Faculty by Kaldor, crosses to the DAE to join the group, becoming an essential contributor of analysis and computer programming for the CEPG policy simulation model, which the DAE houses alongside a separate forecasting model run by the Growth Project under its former director Richard Stone.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan Shipman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe Open UniversityMilton KeynesUK

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