An Approach to Estimating of Criticality of Social Engineering Attacks Traces

  • Anastasiia KhlobystovaEmail author
  • Maxim Abramov
  • Alexander Tulupyev
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Systems, Decision and Control book series (SSDC, volume 199)


In this article we propose to consider the trajectories of social engineering attacks, which are the most critical from the point of view of the expected damage to the organization, and not from the point of view of the probability of success of the defeat of the user and, indirectly, critical documents to which he has access. The article proposes an approach to solving the problem of identifying the most critical path of multiway socio-engineering attack. The most critical trajectory in this article is understood as the most probable trajectory of the attack, which will bring the greatest damage to the organization. As a further development of the research direction, we can consider models that describe in more detail the context and take into account the distribution of the probability of hitting the proportion of documents available to the user, offering models for building integrated damage estimates associated with the affected user, various access policies and accounting for the hierarchy of documents in terms of their criticality or value.


Multi-pass social engineering attacks Social graph of company employees Critical trajectories in social graph Social engineering attacks Users protect Information security 



The research was carried out in the framework of the project on state assignment SPIIRAN № 0073-2018-0001, with the financial support of the RFBR (project № 18-37-00323 Social engineering attacks in corporate information systems: approaches, methods and algorithms for identifying the most probable traces; project № 18-01-00626 Methods of representation, synthesis of truth estimates and machine learning in algebraic Bayesian networks and related knowledge models with uncertainty: the logic-probability approach and graph systems).


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Laboratory of Theoretical and Interdisciplinary Problems of InformaticsSt. Petersburg Institute for Informatics and Automation of the Russian Academy of SciencesSt. PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.Mathematics and Mechanics FacultySt. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia

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