Structural Injustice and the Paradigm of Solidarity

  • Erik O. EriksenEmail author


This chapter analyses the structural injustice created by the Eurozone crisis and the kind of duties it triggers. First, it clarifies why the management of the crisis resulted in structural injustice. The Eurozone has corralled its members into a community of fate, in which all are dependent on all, but where some profit and some lose out under the same economic regime. Then, the chapter raises the problem of unjust enrichment and compensatory obligations in the so-called wrongful-benefits paradigm (WBP). It argues that the type of structural injustice generated by the Eurozone arrangement gives rise to duties that are not in the form of compensatory obligations. Rather, it gives rise to collective, forward-directed duties—duties of solidarity—to correct wrongs akin to political justice.


Eurozone Eurozone crisis Wrongful-benefits paradigm Solidarity Forward-directed duties 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ARENA Centre for European StudiesUniversity of OsloOsloNorway

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