Dominance Through Segmentation

  • Erik O. EriksenEmail author


This chapter deals with vertical differentiation and how the Eurozone has developed into a segment. Before the 2008 financial crisis, differentiated arrangements were not considered a defining trait of the system, since exemptions and opt-outs could be seen as temporary. However, this changed after the Eurozone crisis. The chapter starts by analysing some specific traits of the institutional development of the Eurozone regime. The high level of vertical differentiation involves an incongruence between the Single Market and the single currency as well as between debtors and creditors in the Eurozone. The chapter lays out some dominance effects of segmentation, namely decisional exclusion and pre-emption of choice. Lastly, it presents the analytical advantages of this approach and discusses why segmentation in itself is unstable and self-defeating.


Segmentation Eurozone crisis Dominance Loose couplings Fiscal compact 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ARENA Centre for European StudiesUniversity of OsloOsloNorway

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