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The Impact on Competition by Deregulation of Professions (Reducing Occupational Licenses): The Case of Three Professions in Poland from 1989 to 2018

  • Jarosław BełdowskiEmail author
  • Wiktor WojciechowskiEmail author
  • Łukasz Dąbroś
Chapter
Part of the Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship book series (EALELS, volume 7)

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to the impact on competition which may result from the deregulation of professions (reducing occupational licenses). The reduction of occupational licenses affects various professions to which entry and activity is restricted. In this chapter we describe how the newly born free market economy started from laissez faire approach and ended up with over-regulation of profession within 25 years. We give an overview of literature, which purports to understand the phenomena of regulation of professions. Then we concentrate on describing the historical developments within three professions, namely civil notary, tourist guide and taxi driver in Poland. We observe the role of several counterparts in the process of regulation and deregulation of those professions, in particular the position of competition authority in Poland.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of International Comparative StudiesWarsaw School of EconomicsWarsawPoland

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