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The Use of Identical IP Address by Tender Participants as an Indication of Cartel Scheme

  • Ju. A. Dorofeeva
  • M. A. TokmakovEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 908)

Abstract

The relevance of the study is explained by the increase in the number of contracts entered into by tender, which has caused an increase in the number of cases of illegal (cartel) schemes disclosed by the state body with the use of digital technologies. In this regard, the article is aimed at identifying methods for establishing the presence of a cartel at tenders, including by means of disclosing the use of identical IP addresses by cartel members. The leading approach to the study of the problem of identifying cartel scheme is that its participants do not show the connection between them and the intent of the collusion. Digital technologies make it possible to identify such connection and make it possible, in context with other evidence of scheme presence between parties to identify a cartel, to stop its illegal activities and to not allow an agreement to be entered into at tenders abstracting the law. The article presents an analysis of the norms of legislation, departmental acts of the antimonopoly body and judicial practice in order to identify signs of cartel scheme, including with the use of digital technologies, accounts the grounds for objections of cartel participants to the use of methods to establish illegal collusion by disclosing the fact of identical IP use by tender participants. The materials of the article are of practical value for specialists in the field of antimonopoly law, legal practitioners, government officials specializing in the organization of tenders and the protection of competition.

Keywords

Bid rigging Bidding Bidding conspiracy Cartel Competition protection Digitization Digital technologies IP address 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Samara State University of EconomicsSamaraRussia

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