Evaluation of Vertical Integration
A number of theorists have dealt with the effects of vertical integration as well as the thread of vertical foreclosure as an important effect of vertical integration. Riordan (1998) identifies the possibility of preventing market entry after vertical integration and the availability of superior technology for the integrated enterprise as crucial factors to determine the effects of vertical integration.
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- Siegwarth Meyer C, Wang Y (2011) Determining the competitive effects of vertical integration in mergers. Econ Committee Newsl 11(1):7–11Google Scholar