Evaluation of Vertical Integration

  • Christoph KleinebergEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Law book series (BRIEFSLAW)


A number of theorists have dealt with the effects of vertical integration as well as the thread of vertical foreclosure as an important effect of vertical integration. Riordan (1998) identifies the possibility of preventing market entry after vertical integration and the availability of superior technology for the integrated enterprise as crucial factors to determine the effects of vertical integration.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Competition & Regulation InstituteLeuphana University of LüneburgLüneburgGermany

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