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Introduction

  • Christoph KleinebergEmail author
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Law book series (BRIEFSLAW)

Abstract

Markets have been widely discussed and examined by the general public, politicians, economists, lawyers and regulators as well as competition authorities in many countries. Given the direct effect of well- or malfunctioning markets on consumers’ expenses, there is a broad debate about which measures should be implemented. Politicians, in particular, strongly favour increasing the competitiveness of markets, because they hope that in doing so this would lead to lower product or service prices which result in increased approval by the electorate.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Competition & Regulation InstituteLeuphana University of LüneburgLüneburgGermany

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