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Analysis of the Security Between Smart Vehicles and Parcels in Smart Cities

  • Yassir Rouchdi
  • El Arbi Abdellaoui Alaoui
  • Khalid El YassiniEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Intelligent Transportation and Infrastructure book series (LNITI)

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) is considered as modern concept that will revolutionize the near future. Its interest is to create an environment of combined intelligent devices and systems, communicating with each other through wireless networks. Urban logistics are an applicative field of this new technology, especially for smart parcels and vehicles. Actually, in a context of economy development, the competitiveness between companies and territories necessarily involves an improvement of logistics services. Although these gains offered by IoT, there are significant obstacles to counter. One of the important obstacles to consider is the security. In this paper, we will analyze the interaction between selfish smart vehicles/parcels and malicious smart vehicles/parcels, that was formulated as a game model. As a result, we have calculated the Nash equilibrium and the utilities for the both selfish smart vehicles/parcels and malicious smart vehicles/parcels, evaluate the parameters that can maximize the selfish smart vehicles/parcelss utility when the smart parcels are transported by vehicles between different centers (shops, supermarket ...) was planned and identify the potential malicious smart vehicles/parcels.

Keywords

Intelligent transport system (ITS) Smart city Smart parcel IoT Smart vehicle Game theory Nash equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yassir Rouchdi
    • 1
    • 2
  • El Arbi Abdellaoui Alaoui
    • 3
  • Khalid El Yassini
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.TIClabInternational University of RabatRabatMorocco
  2. 2.IA Laboratory, Faculty of Sciences MeknesMoulay Ismail UniversityMeknesMorocco
  3. 3.EIGSICasablancaMorocco

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