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Dynamic Marketing Model: Optimization of Retailer’s Role

  • Igor BykadorovEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 974)

Abstract

We study a vertical control distribution channel in which a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer. The state variables are the cumulative sales and the retailer’s motivation. The manufacturer chooses wholesale price discount while retailer chooses pass-through. We assume that the wholesale price discount increases the retailer’s sale motivation thus improving sales. In contrast to previous settings, we focus on the maximization of retailer’s profit with respect to pass-through. The arising problem is linear with respect to both cumulative sales and the retailer’s motivation, while it is quadratic with respect to wholesale price discount and pass-through. We obtain a complete description of optimal strategies and optimal trajectories. In particular, we demonstrate that the number of switches for change in the type of optimal policy is no more than one.

Keywords

Retailer Pricing Pass-through Sale motivation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The work was supported in part by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, projects 16-01-00108, 16-06-00101 and 18-010-00728, by the program of fundamental scientific researches of the SB RAS No I.5.1, project 0314-2016-0018, and by the Russian Ministry of Science and Education under the 5-100 Excellence Programme.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sobolev Institute of MathematicsNovosibirskRussia
  2. 2.Novosibirsk State UniversityNovosibirskRussia
  3. 3.Novosibirsk State University of Economics and ManagementNovosibirskRussia

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