To Participate or Not in a Coalition in Adversarial Games

  • Ranbir DhounchakEmail author
  • Veeraruna Kavitha
  • Yezekael Hayel
Conference paper
Part of the Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications book series (SDGTFA)


Cooperative game theory aims to study complex systems in which players have an interest to play together instead of selfishly in an interactive context. This interest may not always be true in an adversarial setting. We consider in this paper that several players have a choice to participate or not in a coalition in order to maximize their utility against an adversarial player. We observe that participating in a coalition is not always the best decision; indeed selfishness can lead to better individual utility. However, this is true under rare yet interesting scenarios. This result is quite surprising as in standard cooperative games; coalitions are formed if and only if it is profitable for players. We illustrate our results with two important resource-sharing problems: resource allocation in communication networks and visibility maximization in online social networks. We also discuss fair sharing using Shapley values, when cooperation is beneficial.


Cooperative game theory Shapely value Social networks 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ranbir Dhounchak
    • 1
    Email author
  • Veeraruna Kavitha
    • 1
  • Yezekael Hayel
    • 2
  1. 1.IIT BombayMumbaiIndia
  2. 2.University of AvignonAvignonFrance

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