Network Games, Control, and Optimization pp 71-87 | Cite as
Media Delivery Competition with Edge Cloud, Remote Cloud and Networking
Abstract
We describe a marketplace for content distribution, specifically stored-video streaming, involving both edge cloud (fog) and remote cloud computing and storage resources. Three different types of participants are considered: providers that are affiliated with the remote cloud, those that are affiliated with the ISP/edge, and those affiliated with neither. For a simple model, we explore the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we formulate a leader-follower game involving a market regulator maximizing a social welfare and study its Stackelberg equilibrium. For a market regulator seeking to limit prices charged by an edge-cloud entrant, we show an interesting trade-off between “moderate” edge-cloud prices and existence of follower (Nash) equilibrium.
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