Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception

  • Athanassios RaftopoulosEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)


In this chapter, I examine the problems that cognitively penetrated (CP) raises for the epistemic role of perception in justifying empirical beliefs. I assess both internalistic and externalistic accounts of perceptual justification and argue that only the latter, especially when they involve a reference to the sensitivity of perception to the environmental input and the way this sensitivity is influenced by CP, offer a promising start to understanding the effects of CP on the epistemic role of perception. This discussion will serve as the basis on which I will base my revisiting the problem of CP.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of CyprusNicosiaCyprus

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