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Governance Models Preferences for Security Information Sharing: An Institutional Economics Perspective for Critical Infrastructure Protection

  • Alain MermoudEmail author
  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
  • Dimitri Percia David
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11260)

Abstract

Empirical studies have analyzed the incentive mechanisms for sharing security information between human agents, a key activity for critical infrastructure protection. However, recent research shows that most Information Sharing and Analysis Centers do not perform optimally, even when properly regulated. Using a meso-level of analysis, we close an important research gap by presenting a theoretical framework that links institutional economics and security information sharing. We illustrate this framework with a dataset collected through an online questionnaire addressed to all critical infrastructures (N = 262) operating at the Swiss Reporting and Analysis Centre for Information Security (MELANI). Using descriptive statistics, we investigate how institutional rules offer human agents an institutional freedom to self-design an efficient security information sharing artifact. Our results show that a properly designed artifact can positively reinforces human agents to share security information and find the right balance between three governance models: (A) public-private partnership, (B) private, and (C) government-based. Overall, our work lends support to a better institutional design of security information sharing and the formulation of policies that can avoid non-cooperative and free-riding behaviors that plague cybersecurity.

Keywords

Economics of information security Security information sharing New Institutional Economics Information Sharing and Analysis Center Critical infrastructure protection Information assurance 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Information Systems, Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC Lausanne)University of Lausanne (UNIL)LausanneSwitzerland
  2. 2.Department of Defense ManagementMilitary Academy at ETH ZurichBirmensdorfSwitzerland
  3. 3.Institute of Technology ManagementUniversity of St. Gallen (HSG)St. GallenSwitzerland

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