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Concluding Remarks

  • Anil HiraEmail author
  • Norbert Gaillard
  • Theodore H. Cohn
Chapter
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

We discuss the implications of our analysis. Persistent regulatory issues continue after the 2008 crash, threaten the stability of financial flows and the world economy, and undermine our democratic societies. The global nature of these issues requires serious efforts to harmonise regulation, create consensus, and promote transparency and enforcement. Our analysis reveals that financial lobbying groups block meaningful reforms through regulatory capture, moral hazard, and unregulated financial flows. The result is that global financial systems continue to be over-leveraged, suffer from unrealistic risk assessments, and operate in the shadows of domestic regulation, while still relying on domestic regulators to bail them out—thus frustrating taxpayers and spurring populism. In short, there is every reason to believe that a crash might happen again.

Keywords

Financial crisis Financial regulation Liberal capitalism Finance capitalism Reform Shadow banking Credit risk 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anil Hira
    • 1
    Email author
  • Norbert Gaillard
    • 2
  • Theodore H. Cohn
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceSimon Fraser UniversityBurnabyCanada
  2. 2.NG ConsultingParisFrance

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