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Eliminativism, Cosmopsychism, and Concluding Remarks

  • Jiri Benovsky
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

The no-self view eliminates the self and it thus eliminates the combination problem involving subjects, but a more general eliminativism is needed if one wants to answer all versions of the combination problem. Cosmopsychism is a brand of monism which mirrors panpsychism. It then has to face the mirror versions of the combination problems. In this chapter, I discuss how these mirror views compare to each other.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland

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