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The Subject of Experience

  • Jiri Benovsky
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this chapter, I reject the need for a subject of experience understood as a bearer of the experience. I defend a variant of the no-self view and I provide an account of diachronic unity, given this view.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland

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