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Incentives, Practical Aspects, and Bare Situational Reasons

  • Peter Herissone-Kelly
Chapter
Part of the Studies in German Idealism book series (SIGI, volume 21)

Abstract

This chapter aims first of all to mount an argument for the conclusion that incentive reasons are genuine agent’s reasons, rather than merely explanatory reasons. That is, incentive reasons are reasons in the light of which an agent comes to take the obtaining of an F-type situation as a reason to Φ, rather than factors that causally explain an agent’s viewing F-type situations in that way. Having established this much, I go on to offer experientially congruent accounts of the incorporation of incentives into maxims, an agent’s constant awareness of the moral law, and the Categorical Imperative’s universalisability test. This will bring into focus the way in which a good-willed agent’s being moved to act by the obtaining of an F-type situation differs in kind from a non-good-willed agent’s being similarly moved. A Kantian good-willed agent, I will urge, is moved by a situation’s merely obtaining (and thus by, as I shall put it, a bare situational reason), in a way that the non-good-willed agent is not: indeed, it is her being so moved that is responsible for her qualifying as good-willed.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Herissone-Kelly
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Humanities and the Social SciencesUniversity of Central LancashirePrestonUK

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