Advertisement

An Ecological Solution to the Problem of Representation

  • Majid Davoody Beni
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 14)

Abstract

In this chapter, I survey an embodied, ecological, enactivist construal of PPT. Let us call this the embodied construal for short. Unlike the inferentialist construal of PPT that has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the embodied construal of PPT can accommodate direct realism. In this chapter, I argue that the embodied construal can be recruited by CSR, and it can be used to deal with the strong version of the problem of representation in a fundamental way. Given the possibility of associating the embodied construal of PPT with direct realism, CSR could rely on this construal of PPT to face the threat of the strong version of the problem of representation in a radical way. This is because the embodied, enactivist, and ecological construal does not recognise the existence of an inferential veil that could distort the relation between cognitive models on the one hand and their target in the world on the other. Hence the problem of representation could be suppressed fundamentally.

References

  1. Allen, M., & Friston, K. J. (2016, December). From cognitivism to autopoiesis: Towards a computational framework for the embodied mind. Synthese, 195(6), 2459–2482.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 617–645.  https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Beni, M. D. (2017a, October). The downward path to epistemic informational structural realism. Acta Analytica, 33, 181–197.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0333-4. SpringerCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Beni, M. D. (2017b). Reconstructing the upward path to structural realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 7(3), 393–409.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-016-0167-8. Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Beni, M. D. (2018a). Syntactical informational structural realism. Minds and Machines, 1–21 Springer Netherlands. Accessed April 5.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9463-8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Beni, M. D. (2018b). Reconstructing probabilistic realism: Re-enacting syntactical structures. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1–21. Springer Netherlands. Accessed September 27.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9426-z.
  7. Bickhard, M. H., & Michael Richie, D. (1983). On the nature of representation: A case study of James Gibson’s theory of perception. New York: Praeger https://philpapers.org/rec/BICOTN.Google Scholar
  8. Bruineberg, J., & Rietveld, E. (2014). Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 599.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00599.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bruineberg, J., Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2016, October). The anticipating brain is not a scientist: The free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. Synthese, 195, 2417–2444.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1. Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Burr, C., & Jones, M. (2016). The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimisation, embodiment, and representation. Philosophical Psychology, 29(4), 586–600.  https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1135238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Calvo, P., Symons, J., & Martin, E. (2012). Beyond ‘error-correction’. Frontiers in Psychology, 3(October), 423.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. London: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Clark, A. (2012). Dreaming the whole cat: Generative models, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception of perceptual experience. Mind, 121(483), 753–771.  https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs106. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Clark, A. (2015). Predicting peace: The end of the representation wars (T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt, Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.  https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570979.
  15. Clark, A. (2016a). Surfing uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217013.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Clark, A. (2016b, April). Busting out: Predictive brains, embodied minds, and the puzzle of the evidentiary veil. Noûs, 51, 727–753.  https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.  https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. da Costa, N. C. A., Bueno, O., & French, S. (1998). The logic of pragmatic truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 27(6), 603–620.  https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004304228785. Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Dolega, K. (2017). Moderate predictive processing. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Philosophy and predictive processing (pp. 161–179). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.  https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Engel, A. K., Maye, A., Kurthen, M., & König, P. (2013). Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(5), 202–209.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.03.006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Friston, K. J. (2010). The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138.  https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2787.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Friston, K. J. (2012). A free energy principle for biological systems. Entropy (Basel, Switzerland), 14(11), 2100–2121.  https://doi.org/10.3390/e14112100. Europe PMC Funders.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Friston, K. J. (2013). Active inference and free energy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 212–213.  https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12002142. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Friston, K. J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., & Kiebel, S. J. (2010). Action and behavior: A free-energy formulation. Biological Cybernetics, 102(3), 227–260.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s00422-010-0364-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Friston, K. J., Thornton, C., & Clark, A. (2012). Free-energy minimisation and the dark-room problem. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 130.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Gallagher, S., & Allen, M. (2016, November). Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition. Synthese, 195, 2627–2648.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1269-8. Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Gibson, J. J. (2015). The ecological approach to visual perception. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.  https://doi.org/10.2307/429816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Glenberg, A. M. (2010). Embodiment as a unifying perspective for psychology. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(4), 586–596.  https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Goldstein, E. B. (1981). The ecology of J. J. Gibson’s perception. Leonardo, 14(3), 191.  https://doi.org/10.2307/1574269. The MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Grant, E. R., & Spivey, M. J. (2003). Eye movements and problem solving: Guiding attention guides thought. Psychological Science, 14(5), 462–466.  https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.02454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Hohwy, J. (2014). The self-evidencing brain. Noûs, 50(2), 259–285.  https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12062.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Hohwy, J. (2017). How to entrain your evil demon. In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and predictive processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.  https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573048.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism basic minds without content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  35. Noë, A. (2002). Direct perception. In Macmillan encyclopedia of cognitive science. London: MacMillan.Google Scholar
  36. Pezzulo, G., & Calvi, G. (2011). Computational explorations of perceptual symbol systems theory. New Ideas in Psychology, 29(3), 275–297.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.07.004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Pezzulo, G., Barsalou, L. W., Cangelosi, A., Fischer, M. H., McRae, K., & Spivey, M. J. (2011, January). The mechanics of embodiment: A dialog on embodiment and computational modeling. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 5.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00005.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Pezzulo, G., Barsalou, L. W., Cangelosi, A., Fischer, M. H., McRae, K., & Spivey, M. J. (2012). Computational grounded cognition: A new alliance between grounded cognition and computational modeling. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 612.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00612. Frontiers Media SA.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. J. (2015). Active inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control. Progress in Neurobiology, 134, 17–35.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2015.09.001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Pezzulo, G., Donnarumma, F., Iodice, P., Maisto, D., & Stoianov, I. (2017). Model-based approaches to active perception and control. Entropy, 19(6), 266.  https://doi.org/10.3390/e19060266. Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Spivey, M. (2008). The continuity of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Majid Davoody Beni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Management, Science, and TechnologyAmirkabir University of TechnologyTehranIran

Personalised recommendations