An Advanced Version of Cognitive Structural Realism
In this chapter, I draw on the resources of contemporary computational neuroscience to provide an updated version of CSR. I shall argue that the resources of the Predictive Processing Theory (PPT) can be used to account for both structuralist and realist components of CSR. I argue that PPT provides the necessary inferential links for accounting for CSR’s notion of scientific representation. Since the implemented Bayesian framework that PPT invokes has a natural propensity for being grounded, this version of CSR provides a solution to the problem of representation. But I will conclude the chapter by pointing out that the inferential nature of the invoked inferential links could still harbour the strong version of the problem of representation.
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