A Rudimentary Version of Cognitive Structural Realism
The chapter launches a new attempt at addressing the problem of representation. In this chapter, I shall argue that to deal with the problem, we may specify the underlying structure of scientific theories in terms of cognitive structures. To introduce the desirable cognitive structures, I shall rely on the preceding work of Churchland and construe it as a new version of structural realism. My construal of Churchland’s work paves the way for a synthesis between CMSA and SR. The chapter outlines a rudimentary version of Cognitive SR and its solution to the problem of representation. A more advanced version that includes further details regarding the underpinning neurological mechanisms and their biological viability will be presented in the next chapters of this book.
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