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Secure Realization of Lightweight Block Cipher: A Case Study Using GIFT

  • Varsha Satheesh
  • Dillibabu Shanmugam
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11348)

Abstract

Lightweight block ciphers are predominately useful in resource constrained Internet-of-Things(IoT) applications. The security of ciphers is often overthrown by various types of attacks, especially, side-channel attacks. These attacks make it necessary for us to come up with efficient countermeasure techniques that can revert the effect caused by these attacks. PRESENT inspired block cipher, GIFT is taken for analysis and development of countermeasure. In this paper: Firstly, we have implemented the GIFT algorithm in (Un)rolled fashion for vulnerability analysis. Then cipher key is revealed successfully using correlation power analysis. We proposed various protected implementation profiles using Threshold Implementation (TI) and realization techniques carried out on the GIFT algorithm. We believe, the case study widens the choice of level-of-security with trade-off factors for secure realization of the cipher based on application requirement.

Keywords

Lightweight block cipher Side-channel Threshold Implementation Internet of Things (IoT) devices 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Executive Director of Society for Electronic Transactions and Society (SETS), Dr. N Sarat Chandra Babu for providing the internship opportunity in hardware security research. We would also like to thank Associate Professor, Thomas Peyrin of Nanyang Technological University (NTU) for sharing the Gift cipher test vectors and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sri Sivasubramaniya Nadar College of EngineeringChennaiIndia
  2. 2.Society for Electronic Transactions and SecurityChennaiIndia

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