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Separation of Body and Soul in Plato’s Phaedo: An Unprecedented Ontological Operation in the Affinity Argument

  • Gabriele CornelliEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 139)

Abstract

The paper aims to address the problem of the separation of body and soul in Plato’s Phaedo, in search of both its ontological features and moral consequences. Apart from the normal approach and use of dialogue as a literary and philosophical milestone for all body-soul dualisms in the history of philosophy, I believe two different ways of understanding this separation are outlined in the dialogue. The first one would indicate a moral separation, regarding what a philosopher should take care of: philosophers are supposed to mind the soul and not the body. A different way to address this separation between body and soul is the one I would like to consider as an ontological separation: the soul is so independent from the body that is declared to survive after its death. In a way, the dualistic ontology of individuals forcefully follows the bodily engagement of a chameleon-like soul in its wandering, both epistemological and moral, through the sensible world.

Keywords

Ontology History of philosophy Ethics Psychology Dualism Plato Phaedo Affinity argument Separation Somatization Incarnation Body Soul Chameleon-like Immortality of the soul 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Archai UNESCO ChairUniversity of BrasiliaBrasiliaBrazil

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