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Xing 性 and Qing 情: Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text Xing zi ming chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Endowment)

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Dao Companion to the Excavated Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts

Part of the book series: Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy ((DCCP,volume 10))

Abstract

Whether human nature is good or bad and how this is related to self-cultivation was a subject of debate among thinkers in early China. This essay analyses the interrelationship of the key concepts human nature (xing 性), human emotions/feelings/affective tendency as manifested xing (qing 情), and heart-mind (xin 心) in the Guodian manuscript Nature Derives from Endowment (Xing zi ming chu 性自命出) discovered in 1993 in Hubei province. The intellectual engagements evident in this Guodian text emerge as more syncretic and dynamic than those that can be found in the discourse of any single tradition, such as Gaozi, Mencius, or Xunzi. Its theory of human nature and moral cultivation reveals the existence of a possibly more diverse intellectual discourse from which the different foci of philosophical debate represented by later thinkers developed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A similar style of reference will be used for other texts: MZ for the Mengzi (Works of Mencius), LY for the Lunyu (the Analects), XZ for the Xunzi, and LJ for the Liji (Book of Rites).

  2. 2.

    An earlier version of this article appeared as “Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text of the Xing Zi Ming Chu,” in Dao: Journal of Comparative Philosophy 8 (2009): 361–82. I thank the editor of the Dao journal for allowing me to republish the article. In this updated version, I re-examine the relationships between xing and qing, in particular, the connotation of qing as manifested human nature xing in response to external stimuli. This understanding is consistent with the Chinese term xing qing 性情 and emphasizes how qing is part of xing and is manifestation of xing. The essay is retitled as shown in the heading above. I thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments that contributed to improving this version.

  3. 3.

    Subsequent to the discovery of the bamboo texts, scholars looked at the possible association of the texts with schools or different branches of schools, in particular the Confucian school, given their different views on human nature. Most Chinese scholars believe the cache represents works from the Zisi-Mencian lineage. Both Tao Lei and Zhou Fengwu believe that the discussion of human nature in the Xing zi ming chu is closer to Gaozi’s view (Tao 2001; Zhou 2004). It has been argued that both the Xing zi ming chu and the Liu de in the Guodian corpus have traces of Gaozi’s and others’ views. For example the Liu de contains the concept similar to Gaozi’s “humaness comes from within and appropriateness acquired from without” ren nei yi wai 仁內義外, and that it takes xing as what is born. This was the thinking prevailing in the pre-Qin period as were the views of Gaozi and ShiShuo 世碩. Western scholars such as Paul Goldin and Michael Puett have argued that the XZMC is closest to the Xunzi (Goldin 2005; Puett 2004). Slingerland tends to follow Brindley in suggesting the association with Gaozi, though he provides no detailed discussion in this regard; Brindley discusses the function of music, Slingerland spontaneity, and Andreini and Puett human emotions (Brindley 2006; Slingerland 2008; Andreini 2006; Puett 2004).

  4. 4.

    My interpretations are primarily based on the text of the XZMC, although for our discussion they will draw comparisons with such Confucian texts as the Analects, the Works ofMencius, and Xunzi, as well as Daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi when necessary in order to shed light on the development of related concepts. Similarities between the Guodian text and concepts of other thinkers are pointed out more for analytical purposes rather than for trying to suggest a causal influence on later philosophers’ writings; further studies are required before such claims can be made. Throughout, I place the transcribed Chinese texts based on Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Bamboo Slip Manuscripts from the Chu Tomb at Guodian) (Jingmenshi Bowuguan 1998) and Guodian Chujian jiaodu ji 郭店楚簡校讀記 (A Collation of the Guodian Manuscripts) (Li 2002) next to my translation as well as the strip numbers. Given the nature of the Guodian texts, my translations and interpretations are necessarily tentative.

  5. 5.

    It seems to me that the XZMC has revealed an intellectual landscape that is much more dynamic, and its position on human nature and moral cultivation is more diverse, than one would represent as a single tradition (for example, Gaozi, Mencius, or Xunzi).

  6. 6.

    It is unfortunate that the strip is damaged following the character 性. Various insertions have been suggested: most scholars follow the version that inserts shiran 使然, ren 人, which makes the whole sentence read “[an ox is born and grows large, a goose is born and stretches up]—their xing (makes them so; people) learn and this is how it makes them so” (其性使然, 人而學或使之也); Tu Zongliu and Liu Zuxin, on the other hand, insert only shiran 使然 (Tu and Liu 2001: 148). It seems to me that the first translation is abrupt, particularly if we take 之 at the end of the sentence to be referring to the characteristic tendencies of an ox and a wild goose. The insertion of two characters may risk missing one character, as there seems to be enough space for three characters, yet, even if we accept the common view that the spacing in the bamboo strips looks more likely to have accommodated three characters instead of two, we cannot be certain it would be the character ren 人. It may still be grammatically correct to say, for example, “their nature causes them; it may also be that how they were born for learning causes them to be so” (其性使然, 生而學或使之也). This kind of grammatical structure is common and can be compared to, for example, sheng er zhi zhi 生而知之 in the Lunyu. While the reconstruction is uncertain—and I have put the (?) to allow the possibilities of different readings—it seems to make sense to suggest that both xing and the learning or practice of a particular species, be they animal or human, are crucial in shaping what they are, though it is clear that there are differences in their learning and ability to learn and these should be understood as part of their xing.

  7. 7.

    Goldin proposes that “xing refers to what is inborn in an organism and thus to the features that all members of a certain species hold in common rather than the features that distinguish a certain species from all other species” (Goldin 2005: 57). My interpretation suggests that what is inborn by xing, together with acquired knowledge and learning, determine the characteristic features shared by a certain species, and the features that distinguish a certain group of species from all other species.

  8. 8.

    The XZMC supports the concept of xing that includes the course of development when it states “the xing has caused and contributed to the growth and development of the ox and the wild goose as shown in their characteristic tendencies” (其性使然). This notion of xing also appears in such early texts as the Zuozhuan and Guoyu. For a detailed discussion of the concepts of xing in early Chinese texts, see Shun (1997: 37–40).

  9. 9.

    In his precept “there is little difference between man and animals” (MZ, 8.19), Mencius is asserting that humans should be differentiated from other animals by their natural tendency to acknowledge ethical obligations. Moreover, fulfilling these obligations means following heaven (tian). Also see Shun (1997: 210–26) and Perkins (2005: 327–40).

  10. 10.

    This can be seen in the case of the feral child, which may pose a problem for Mencius’ claim. The feral child observed by an educational psychologist lived with a pack of dogs and acted like them: “When we’re talking about how a child learns to live with dogs, there’s obviously no deal, as such. There’s give and take, the dogs give their love, attention, and acceptance in a sense, while the child has to adapt to the dogs’ situation. If that means eating raw meat and scavenging the rubbish tip, then that’s what has to be done in order to survive.” The author of the XZMC would probably see the feral children’s condition as due to lack of a conducive environment (for example, neglect and abuse), rather than inborn inclination. In fact, these poor creatures were sub-human and could no longer be regarded as human beings: they could not walk, talk, or socialize; they could not show empathy with others (Touhey 1973: 396–97).

  11. 11.

    By potential, I am highlighting the point that proper guidance is required in order for this moral sense or ability to develop. External influence would refer to proper human practice and social norms. It is equally crucial to recognize that men have the responsibility to enlarge and alone among beings are capable of enlarging this human way—人能弘道 as the Analects states. Confucius indeed pointed out that we should always follow human, as opposed to animal, practice (鳥獸不可與同群) (LY, 18.6). I say “includes” to echo the dynamism of the term xing, and suggest that there are elements that can or cannot be morally desirable in the xing.

  12. 12.

    This is close to Confucius’ expression “following what the heart-mind desires” (cong xin suo yu 從心所欲) (LY, 2.4).

  13. 13.

    Philosophers have called these a natural or basic repertoire of emotions constituting human nature (Solomon 1995).

  14. 14.

    However, yue 悅 could refer to emotional, biological, sensorial, etc. satisfaction and is subjective; again, it could be morally desirable or the opposite.

  15. 15.

    The early texts such as the Liji also claim that human nature as imparted by heaven is inactive at birth; it is activated by external objects as stimuli, and expressed as human desire as part of human nature.

  16. 16.

    In this line, the Jingmenshi Bowuguan editors have followed the Shanghai Museum collection’s Xingqing Lun 性情論 and inserted the characters 善性也 after 善不, which makes the whole line read 善不善性也. There are three possible ways of reading this. If we take shan as a verb, the sentence can mean “to become good or not good,” which focuses more on factors other than the inborn xing that determine the direction of development. This usage of shan can be found in the Analects—just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good (子欲善而民善矣) (LY, 12.19)—and in the Liji—[it could be used] to make the hearts of the people good (而可以善民心) (LJ, 19.10). It can also be interpreted as meaning that there are both good or bad elements in human nature where the emphasis is on predetermined or inborn quality. When this paper was presented at the “Virtue: East and West” conference, Cheng Chung-ying suggested a third way of reading the sentence: “making good of what is not good is xing.” This reading, similar to the second reading, assumes that there are morally unfavourable (不善) element(s) in human xing, yet humans’ xing enables them to improve it. I am inclined to the first reading, which would make 善不善性也 similar to 性可以善可以不善 (xing can be made good or it can be made bad), a view that is closer to the theme of the whole text. This reading does not exclude the possibility of the second and third readings; it also parallels the idea that xing refers to both inborn nature and natural tendencies over the course of one’s life. One can probably argue that these connotational complexities of the nature of xing are what caused Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi, and ShiShuo to have different ideas about human xing.

  17. 17.

    Though it seems that tian and ming are important concepts in this text and appear at the outset—性自命出, 命从天降—neither is discussed extensively. I borrow the terms “normative” and “descriptive” from Shun, who has distinguished two major dimensions in the use of tian and ming: “a normative dimension that carries implications about what should be done or should happen, and a descriptive dimension implying that certain things are not due to human effort or not fully within human control” (Shun 1997: 17).

  18. 18.

    逆 is also read as 逢 (Liu and Long 2005: 57; Tu and Liu 2001: 150–51). Qiu Xigui has recently revised the reading of 或交之 to 或節之 (Qiu 2006: 2–3).

  19. 19.

    Li Ling suggests that gu 故 implies purposeful activities such as cultural and social practice, a view similar to that held by Qiu Xigui and Liang Tao (Li 2002: 117–18; Qiu 2003; Liang 2004). As both Qiu and Liang point out, gu here refers to social or institutional practice, which gives the extended meaning of “the principles or rules” that provide the framework for social norms and values. More specifically, these are the practices enacted by the Odes, the Book of History, the Rites, and the Music, listed elsewhere in the text of the XZMC.

  20. 20.

    Unlike Mencius or Xunzi, Confucius did not make any straightforward comment on the state of human nature, asserting only that “people are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of practice” (LY, 17.2). Unless otherwise stated, I have used, with some modifications, D.C. Lau’s translations of the Analects (Lau 1979).

  21. 21.

    It is not difficult to see traces of Gaozi, Mencius, Xunzi, and even ShiShuo’s theories of human nature in this text when it focuses on different aspects of the arguments.

  22. 22.

    One may argue that human beings are well integrated systems, and any separation between the physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual is artificial, contrived merely for purposes of analysis.

  23. 23.

    The opening line of the text, claiming that by pleasure xin can be stirred/activated and that through practice it can have an intention, implicitly acknowledges the cognitive and affective capacity of xin. Both Mencius and Xunzi shared the XZMC’s view on this. Xunzi and Mencius, however, were emphasizing different dimensions of xin and thus its role in moral cultivation (see Lee 2004). Mencius used xin most of the time to refer to particular categories of feelings that he believed were the inborn sprouts of morality (Shun 1997: 153). For Mencius, moral cultivation meant nurturing and reinforcing the incipient moral emotion in xin. Xunzi, on the other hand, took xin as our cognitive ability to exert and direct ourselves to acquire and understand the ethical ideals that are imposed externally. In another Guodian text, this affective quality of xin that evokes the process of thinking and reflection (si 思) is shown as a step forward in developing virtue (Csikszentmilhalyi 2004: 73–74). A similar conception of si also appears in the Analects (Ivanhoe 2000: 2–3).

  24. 24.

    A similar observation in relation to xin can be made about the Analects, where the word xin appears only six times. Nevertheless, this signals that Confucius was already shaping the concept of xin to play a role in attaining moral concepts or ideals. This can be seen in such terms as “employing one’s mind” (yongxin 用心) (LY, 17.22) and “his xin did not deviate from ren for three months” (qi xin san yue bu wei ren 其心三月不違仁) (LY, 6.11), and in Confucius saying that when he came to a state that he was able to follow the rules of propriety without any apprehension—“following one’s heart’s desire without overstepping the line” (cong xin suo yu bu yu ju 從心所欲不逾矩) (LY, 2.4).

  25. 25.

    道者, 群物之道。凡道, 心術為主。道四術, 唯人道為可道也。其三術者, 道之而已。詩、書、禮、樂, 其始出, 皆生於人。詩, 有為為之也。書, 有為言之也。禮、樂, 有為擧之也。聖人比其類而論會之, 觀其之 (先) 後而逆順之, 體其義而節文之, 理其情而出入之, 然後復以教。教, 所以生德於中者也。禮作於情, 或興之也. (As for the dao, it is the way of various things. For any dao, the techniques of xin play the principal role. While the dao comprises four techniques, only the human dao can be daoed. The other three arts simply guide it. The Odes, the Documents, the Rites and the Music were all initially produced by men. Through effort were the Odes composed; through effort were the Documents preached; through effort were the Rites and the Music promoted: the sage(s) compared the types, analysed them, and assembled them into categories. He observed their sequence and rearranged them; he comprehended their [ideas of] propriety and refined them. He sifted the emotions/feelings [expressed or inspired by them], and made them become manifest or remain within. He then used them again for teaching. Teaching is therefore the means by which de (virtue) is born within. Rituals arise in feelings, and sometimes to stimulate/arouse them.) (XZMC, strips 14–18) My own translation.

  26. 26.

    Translation has been modified from the last version of my paper.

  27. 27.

    “Music is happiness. The noble people find happiness in attaining their way (dao 道), while the petty people find happiness in attaining what they desire” (樂者, 樂也。君子樂得其道, 小人樂得其欲) (XZ, 20). One should note that the author of the XZMC did not suggest that self-cultivation cannot be accomplished without music. Instead, the text is arguing for a relative efficiency in the process of cultivation by using music.

  28. 28.

    Here, wei 偽 denotes the unnatural, forced, mendacious, and hypocritical as opposed to the genuine and sincere. The character in the XZMC was originally written with the heart radical instead of the human radical, which leads Pang Pu 龐朴 to suggest that it denotes a kind of “psychologically hypocrisy” (jiao qing 矯情) (Tu and Liu 2001: 176). Slingerland has proposed the term “psychological exertion,” believing that in the Guodian corpus striving is morally suspect (Slingerland 2008).

  29. 29.

    Eifring has pointed out that, while the term qing has been translated as “emotions,” it has much wider connotations, including “feeling” (ganjue 感覺), “feeling, emotional response” (gan 感), “feelings; state of mind” (huai 懷),“emotion, mood, temper” (qingxu 情緒),“emotion, feeling” (qinggan 情感), “feeling, affection” (ganqing 感情),“emotional disposition, temperament, sensibility” (xingqing 性情) (Eifring 2004: 2–3). Similarly, in this paper, emotion/feeling” is used in a broad sense, referring to “state of mind” as well as to a particular (mental) response to situation(s).

  30. 30.

    Xunzi made a contrast between xing and xue. Xunzi’s understanding of human nature led him to the conclusion that achieving the right motivation and behaviour requires an exertion of force that he refers to as artifice (wei 偽); it is not part of our xing but something imposed from outside through learning (XZ, 23).

  31. 31.

    This accords well with what Confucius proposed, that is, only a well-balanced admixture of native substance and acquired refinement can result in an ideal character (LY, 6.18).

  32. 32.

    Confucius’ view on the nature of this ren can be easily detected in the Analects. For example, the performance and practice of li must be coupled with proper attitude or mental state: What can a man who is not ren do with li? What can a man who is not ren do with music? (LY, 3.3). It is not clear from the text, but chu and ru might imply a kind of movement of qi in terms of moral sensibilities. The problem with using the words internal (nei) and external (wai) is that it overlooks the fact that both ren (or, to the same extent, qing in the XZMC) and yi as moral sensibilities involve internal or psychological activities. Strictly speaking, qing is similar to yi in that it is not mechanically internal, either.

  33. 33.

    The other kinds are not listed elsewhere, so we do not know what they might be.

  34. 34.

    I have provided my own translation for this passage of the Zhuangzi.

  35. 35.

    For a discussion of the writing and manuscript culture of these ancient texts, see Chap. 3 by He and Nylan; and Chap. 4 by Meyer in this volume.

  36. 36.

    Lai and Wu, from the “Zhousong” 周頌 of the Odes, are songs praising King Wu of Western Zhou. The musical performance is a combination of singing of the Odes and a dance performance of the sung poetry.

  37. 37.

    Shao and Xia are music of the sage kings. Shao is the music of Shun 舜 (周禮春官·大司樂); Xia is also referred to as Da Xia from Yu 禹 (Ding 2002: 64).

  38. 38.

    Scholars offer different suggestions for what qi 其 refers to in these sentences. Some Chinese scholars take it as the music itself. Liu Zhao, for example, explains 其出入也順 as music coming and going from the heart (Liu 2003). Others believe these passages are describing how one reacts to music, so that qi should refer to the individual who is morally trained through music: through music, the dancers and the aspiring junzi are able to enter a process of moral cultivation that combines internal feelings and ritual movements. Both readings are possible. However, it seems to me that the second reading is more agreeable. So far I have not come across music described in this way, whereas a similar structure—反古復始—has been used referring to the way of transforming people, for example, in the Liji: 教民反古復始 (LJ, 25.28).

  39. 39.

    Li Xueqin suggests that cong 從 should be read zhong 縱: Thus, the music of Zheng and Wei is not the genuine sound of music but of sensual debauchery. So here the sentence can be taken as saying that the music of Zheng and Wei should not be followed (Ding 2002: 136–39). The music (or the sounds) of Zheng and Wei has been criticized in various early texts, including the Liji and the Analects, for indulging the passions (yin 淫). Another way of reading this sentence is “The music of Zheng and Wei is not the sound that one should follow and yet (people) follow it.” The confusion probably results from the ambiguity of zhi 之. Either way, the primary message is that music like that of Zheng and Wei should not be listened to.

  40. 40.

    Some scholars see guyue 古樂 and yiyue 益樂, used here to contrast good and bad music, since yi 益is read yi 溢, an alternative for yin 淫, meaning excessive or indulgent. Others take yiyue to refer to music with an accompaniment, which is not necessarily bad (see Ding 2002: 68). However, the following sentence—皆教其人者也—makes it clear that the music referred to is good. The guyue and yiyue are probably special references to, respectively, Shao, Xia and Lai, Wu. Thus, I translate yi as “good.” Zhi 指 means “intention” (see 尚書·盤庚上: 王播告之脩, 不匿厥指, where zhi refers to the king’s intention) (Ding 2002: 68). I read long 龍as he 和 (see 廣雅∙釋詁三: 龍, 和也), whereas Li Ling reads it as dong 動 (Tu and Liu 2001: 164; Ding 2002: 68). I follow Tu and Liu.

  41. 41.

    “Sing (that is, celebrate in musical form) of (military) capture” (樂取). Liu Zhao believes there is a military implication here (Liu 2003: 98).

  42. 42.

    Confucius makes this comment on the Shao and Wu: 子謂《韶》: 韶盡美矣, 又盡善也。謂《武》: 盡美矣, 未盡善也 (LY, 3.25). It is generally accepted that the Shao is better than Wu because the former was the music of King Shun, who reigned by means of virtue, whereas the latter was the music of King Wu who, even though he was a good king, conquered the Shang through violence. The results of teaching these different types of music were expected to be different. Here, 取 may imply the way in which King Wu took the world—through intention, desire, and ambition.

  43. 43.

    These sentences explain how heart (xin 心), thinking (si 思), and qing are related (see MZ, 11.15).

  44. 44.

    A similar description appears in the “Yueji” of the Liji, for example, 凡音之起, 由人心生也。人心之動, 物使之然也。感於物而動, 故形於聲。聲相應, 故生變, 變成方, 謂之音; 比音而樂之, 及干戚羽旄, 謂之樂... 是故其哀心感者, 其聲噍以殺。其樂聲感者, 其聲以緩... 凡音者, 生人心者也。情動於中, 故形於聲。聲成文, 謂之音。是故, 治世之音安於樂, 其政和。亂世之音怨以怒, 其政乖... All the modulations of the voice arise from the mind, and the various affections of the mind are produced by things (external) to it. The affections thus produced are manifested in the sounds that are uttered. Changes are produced by the way in which those sounds respond to one another; and those changes constitute what we call the modulations of the voice. The combination of those modulated sounds, so as to give pleasure, and the (direction in harmony with them of the) shields and axes, and of the plumes and ox-tails, constitutes what we call music... When the mind is moved to sorrow, the sound is sharp and fading away; when it is moved to pleasure, the sound is slow and gentle... All modulations of the voice shape the minds of men. When the feelings are moved within, they are manifested in the sounds of the voice; and when those sounds are combined so as to form compositions, we have what are called airs. Hence, the airs of an age of good order indicate composure and enjoyment, [Legge had omitted this sentence: and its government is in peace.] The airs of an age of disorder indicate dissatisfaction and anger, and its government is perversely bad... (Kongzi and Legge 1967: 92–93).

  45. 45.

    Furthermore, the profound power of good music on the listener is not limited to the very moment of listening but is long lasting and can even overcome our basic desire for food. This is exemplified in the Analects where Confucius was described as “not being able to notice the taste of meat for three days” after hearing a musical performance of Shao (LY, 7.14).

  46. 46.

    The original in the XZMC is “The eyes’ love of beauty and the ears’ love of sound is about the qi of anxiety [which if the desire is not satisfied] people have no trouble dying for these things” (目之好色, 耳之樂聲, 鬱陶之氣也, 人不難爲之死) (XZMC, strips 43–44). By “in a neutral sense” I relate back to the earlier discussion in this paper about how our natural sensual desire, which is part of our xing, may or may not be morally desirable. Which aspects of these elements are drawn out and affirmed depends on external stimuli. For example, good and bad music will have different impacts on the process of cultivation.

  47. 47.

    The function of music in moral transformation has also been explicitly discussed in other early texts, for example, the “Records of Music” in the Book ofRites. Music for Xunzi is effective in moral transformation because it satisfies the natural human desire for sensual pleasure. The Xunzi says: “Music is joy; it is what humans cannot avoid in their qing.” While recognizing qing as part of human nature, Xunzi tended to relate it to natural desire (yu 欲), which was based on self-interest and thus needed to be controlled.

  48. 48.

    Obviously, since proper stimuli are required for the development of moral sensibility, it is only good music that should be used. This is pointed out in the passage about the music of Zheng and Wei not worthy of being followed.

  49. 49.

    “[Therefore] a junzi would take [his] bodily engagement to command/regulate his heart/mind” (君子身以爲主心) (XZMC, strip 67). More literally, we may suggest: “(For) the junzi, it is the body that he uses to master his heart.” I would take shen as meaning one’s holistic engagement of practical experience, a meaning that can be found in the Mencius—堯舜性之也, 湯武身之也, 五霸假之也. Through training the body, that is, the experience of the coherent whole through practice, one rectifies one’s xin. This echoes the first line of the XZMC, where it is stated that xin does not have a fixed will (心無定志), and its function is subject to environmental influence, pleasure, and practice. The same sentence can also mean the junzi’s conduct is taken to rectify the hearts of the multitudes. One’s outward appearance, voice, and mannerisms (that is, persona) can affect one’s internal dispositions. Furthermore, once the proper dispositions have been acquired, these same appearances and mannerisms serve to express the cultivated individual’s “moral power” (de 德), and provide a medium for moral leadership in regulating the hearts of the people.

  50. 50.

    I thank Philip Ivanhoe for his generous comments and suggestions on my translations of the words mei 美, gui 貴, shan 善, hao 好, yao 樂, and yue 悅.

  51. 51.

    When he drew a comparison between knowing (zhi 知), desiring (hao 好), and taking pleasure in (yao 樂), Confucius made it clear that taking pleasure in what we acquire is the greatest accomplishment: “To know it is not as good as to desire it, and to desire it is not as good as to take delight in it” (LY, 6.20).

  52. 52.

    In fact, the harmonious unity of moral virtuosity and bodily aesthetics is well captured in the Analects 7.6. This is further illuminated by the well-known story of Butcher Ding in the Zhuangzi. In this story we are told how Butcher Ding cut up an ox in a beautiful and skilful way. After many years of practice he had come to a state of mastery and freedom that was not just physically easy and aesthetic; he was also able to do it without looking at it, because he had internalized the Way, and his spirit went freely to where his blade should go. The rhythmic dancing and free mind of Butcher Ding when carving up the ox represents the total concordance of ritual restraints and harmonious freedom. Scott Cook has proposed that Zhuangzi’s relation to the Confucian school needs to be re-examined, arguing that although Zhuangzi was fond of highlighting the absurdities of the Confucian enterprise, there is in his writings a great admiration for much of what constituted the central core of Confucius’ image of “musical perfection,” representing the total concordance of ritual restraints and harmonious freedom (Cook 1997: 521–54). For discussion on the relation between body and mind in the Guodian corpus, especially the Xing zi ming chu,Wuxing and Ziyi, please see Chap. 13 by Lisa Raphals.

  53. 53.

    I have written on the Guodian Yucong 語叢 for this purpose in Chap. 14 of this volume.

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Chan, S. (2019). Xing 性 and Qing 情: Human Nature and Moral Cultivation in the Guodian Text Xing zi ming chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Endowment). In: Chan, S. (eds) Dao Companion to the Excavated Guodian Bamboo Manuscripts. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04633-0_12

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