Finite Minds

  • Michael Huemer
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 404)


Infinitism claims that a belief is justified only if it stands at one end of an infinite series of available reasons. I argue that this condition cannot be satisfied by any human mind. In general, as one expands the list of propositions that a subject is said to believe, one must either add new basic evidence, add increasingly complex propositions, or include propositions that are ever more similar to each other. But I argue that (a) for a proposition to be available to one as a reason, one must either believe it or be disposed to acquire the belief without the need of acquiring new evidence, (b) there is a limit to the complexity of the propositions that a human mind can grasp, and (c) there is a limit to the capacity of a human mind to distinguish propositions. Thus, no human being can have infinitely many propositions available as reasons.


Infinitism Epistemology of the infinite Finite mind Finite mind objection Cognitive limitations Complexity of propositions Availability of propositions Klein Epistemology 


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Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Huemer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Colorado BoulderBoulderUSA

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