Advertisement

Foot Soldiers and Firepower: Prices on Raiding Services

  • Ararat L. Osipian
Chapter

Abstract

Predatory raiders that take part in violent storming and defense of stormed enterprises are regarded as foot soldiers of the raiding movement. They have their qualitative characteristics, including firepower and prices charged for raiding services. Both law enforcement agencies and private security agencies exercise their right and duty to protect private and state property. The mass privatization of the 1990s brought to life the need to protect private property on a massive scale. At the same time, state law enforcement agencies were no longer capable of or willing to protect private property. The state lost its monopoly on the physical protection of property. Private security firms partially replace the state in its function of protecting private property. Corruption in the law enforcement agencies, judiciary, and other related state bureaucracies helps predatory raiders to target successful and financially sound businesses as well as federal and municipal properties of high market value.

References

  1. Bunin, I. (2008). Reiderstvo kak sotsial’no-ekonomicheskij i politicheskij fenomen sovremennoj Rossii: otchet o kachestvennom sotsiologicheskom issledovanii. Issledovanie “Tsentra politicheskih tehnologij” pod rukovodstvom Bunina. Moskva, 2008. [Raiding as a Socioeconomic and Political Phenomenon of the Modern Russia: A Report on the Qualitative Sociological Investigation. An Investigation Conducted by the Center of Political Technologies]. Moscow, May 2008. Retrieved June 12, 2009, from http://www.politcom.ru/; http://www.compromat.ru/main/mix1/raiderycpt.htm
  2. Fedorov, A. (2010). Reiderstvo i korporativny shantazh (organizatsionno-pravovye mery protivodejstviya) [Raiding and Corporate Blackmail]. Moscow: Volters Kluwer.Google Scholar
  3. Firestone, T. (2008). Criminal Corporate Raiding in Russia. The International Lawyer, 42(4), 1207–1230.Google Scholar
  4. Kireev, A. (2007). Raiding and the Market for Corporate Control: The Evolution of Strong-Arm Entrepreneurship. Problems of Economic Transition, 50(8), 29–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Kolennikova, O., Kosals, L., & Ryvkina, R. (2004). Kommertsializatsiya sluzhebnoj deyatel’nosti rabotnikov militsii [Commercialization of the Service by the Law Enforcement Officers]. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 3, 73–83.Google Scholar
  6. Shelley, L., & Deane, J. (2016). The Rise of Reiderstvo: Implications for Russia and the West. Washington, DC: Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. Retrieved January 12, 2017, from http://www.reiderstvo.org/sites/default/files/The_Rise_of_Reiderstvo.pdf
  7. Tkachenko, N., & Lobodenko, M. (2007). Mekhanizm provedennya rejders’kyh atak ta shemy zahoplennya biznesu yak chinnyk ekonomichnoji nebezpeky diyal’nosti sub’yektiv gospodaryuvannya [Mechanism of Conducting Raiding Attacks and Schemes of Taking Over Business as a Factor of Economic Insecurity for Economic Agents and Firms]. Nauchnye trudy DonNTU. Ekonomicheskie nauki, 31(3), 211–215.Google Scholar
  8. Volkov, V. (2005). Po tu storonu sudebnoj sistemy, ili Pochemu zakony rabotayut ne tak, kak dolzhny [On the Other Side of the Justice System or Why Don’t Laws Work as They Should]. Neprikosnovennyj zapas, 4(42). Retrieved June 10, 2009, from http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2005/42/vv6.html
  9. Volkov, V., Dmitrieva, A., Paneyakh, E., & Pozdnyakov, M. (2011). Aktivnost’ pravookhranitel’nykh organov RF po vyyavleniyu prestuplenij v sfere ekonomicheskoj deyatel’nosti, 2000–2011 gg. [Productivity of Law Enforcement Agencies in Investigating Economic Crimes, 2000–2011]. Moscow: The Institute for the Rule of Law, European University in St Petersburg. Retrieved January 10, 2012, from http://www.enforce.spb.ru/images/analit_zapiski/pm_econ_crime_1111.pdf

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

Personalised recommendations