Advertisement

Prospects of Raiding Evolution: Prognosis Is Optimistic

  • Ararat L. Osipian
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter analyzes future prospects of raiding evolution and suggests that prognosis for predatory raiding movement in Russia is optimistic, at least for raiders. The rationale for discussing any topic largely depends on its magnitude and meaning for the future. In this sense, defining perspectives of predatory raiding movement is much more than just fortunetelling. Russian business ecosystem is not ready to weed out predatory raiders, and the state has no interest in doing this either. This chapter discusses the future of predatory raiding within a theoretical framing, labeled as a revolutionary theory of permanent lawlessness. When the rule of law is not the state’s priority, the decline in predatory raiding is unlikely.

References

  1. Aleksashenko, S. (2018). Putin’s Counterrevolution. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
  2. Aslund, A. (1997). Economic Causes of Crime in Russia. In J. Sachs & K. Pistor (Eds.), The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia (pp. 79–94). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  3. Barnes, A. (2006). Owning Russia: The Struggle over Factories, Farms, and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Chapaev, R. (2007). International Commercial Arbitration: Assessment Report on the Results of the Assessment in the CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and Mongolia. Washington, DC: EBRD-World Bank Retrieved May 9, 2009, from http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/judicial/arbitrat/arbitration.pdfGoogle Scholar
  5. Hellman, J. (2002). Russia’s Transition to a Market Economy: A Permanent Redistribution? In A. Kuchins (Ed.), Russia After the Fall (pp. 93–109). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Google Scholar
  6. Krylova, Y. (2018). Corruption and the Russian Economy: How Administrative Corruption Undermines Entrepreneurship and Economic Opportunities. New York and London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Ledeneva, A. (2004). Underground Financing in Russia. In J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (pp. 71–90). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Pistor, K., & Xu, C. (2004). Beyond Law Enforcement: Governing Financial Markets in China and Russia. In J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (pp. 167–189). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Rochlitz, M. (2014). Corporate Raiding and the Role of the State in Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(2–3), 89–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Schreck, Carl. (2018). Russian Asylum Applications in U.S. Hit 24-Year Record. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 2. Retrieved May 14, 2018, from https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-asylum-applications-in-u-s-hit-24-year-record/29204843.html
  11. Shlapentokh, V. (2007). Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society: A New Perspective on the Post-Soviet Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Shlapentokh, V., & Arutunyan, A. (2013). Freedom, Repression, and Private Property in Russia. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Soldatov, A., & Rochlitz, M. (2018). The Siloviki in Russian Politics. In D. Treisman (Ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia (pp. 83–108). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Google Scholar
  14. Sonin, K. (2003). Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 715–731.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Sonin, K. (2005). Institutsional’naya teoriya beskonechnogo peredela [Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution]. Voprosy ekonomiki, 7, 1–15. Retrieved May 9, 2009, from http://fir.nes.ru/~ksonin/VESonin.pdfGoogle Scholar
  16. Volkov, V. (2004). The Selective Use of State Capacity in Russia’s Economy: Property Disputes and Enterprise Takeovers, 1998–2002. In J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.), Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition (pp. 126–147). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Volkov, V. (2005). Po tu storonu sudebnoj sistemy, ili Pochemu zakony rabotayut ne tak, kak dolzhny [On the Other Side of the Justice System or Why Don’t Laws Work as They Should]. Neprikosnovennyj zapas, 4(42). Retrieved May 9, 2009, from http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2005/42/vv6.html

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

Personalised recommendations