Wild-West Capitalism in the East

  • Ararat L. Osipian


This chapter departs from the literature surveyed on the context of predatory raiding in Russia, presented in the introductory chapter. It starts with the emergence of Wild-West capitalism in Russia. This chapter considers how the new social archetype—Communist cowboy capitalists—captured Russia in the course of economic reforms during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It further links the concept of social Darwinism with predatory hostile takeovers. This chapter emphasizes that the struggle for survival or competition that takes place in modern Russian business ecosystem is based on the use of noneconomic factors, including direct violence. Predatory raiders actively use corruption and violence as two dominant forms of state-society and state-business relations.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ararat L. Osipian
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Wisconsin–MadisonMadisonUSA

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