An Empirical Investigation of Human Rights in Recession
This chapter presents the research methodology applied to empirically evaluate the government’s commitment to women’s economic rights and respect for basic human rights during systemic banking crises. It describes the sample, dependent and independent variables, and the statistical techniques applied to model the changes. The results mostly support the theoretical postulates. There is a greater likelihood of lower women’s economic rights during financial crises than otherwise in the low-income countries. The government’s respect for basic human rights during systemic banking crises improves with the increase in the opposition parties’ strength in the national legislature.
KeywordsHuman rights Financial crisis Women’s economic rights Physical integrity rights Low-income countries
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