An Empirical Investigation of Human Rights in Recession

  • Rana S. Gautam


This chapter presents the research methodology applied to empirically evaluate the government’s commitment to women’s economic rights and respect for basic human rights during systemic banking crises. It describes the sample, dependent and independent variables, and the statistical techniques applied to model the changes. The results mostly support the theoretical postulates. There is a greater likelihood of lower women’s economic rights during financial crises than otherwise in the low-income countries. The government’s respect for basic human rights during systemic banking crises improves with the increase in the opposition parties’ strength in the national legislature.


Human rights Financial crisis Women’s economic rights Physical integrity rights Low-income countries 


  1. Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2): 155–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, and Francesco Trebbi. 2006. Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy of Reforms. IMF Staff Papers 53 (Special Issue): 1–29.Google Scholar
  3. Apodaca, Clair. 2001. Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights After the Cold War. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 587–602.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Banks, Arthur S. 2011. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, CNTS Data Archive.
  5. Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. Time-Series-Cross-Section-Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years? Annual Review of Political Science 4 (1): 271–293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data. The American Political Science Review 89 (3): 634–647.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bellemare, Marc F., Takaaki Masaki, and Thomas B. Pepinsky. 2017. Lagged Explanatory Variables and the Estimation of Causal Effect. Journal of Politics 79 (3): 949–963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 1999. Respect for Human Rights after the End of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research 36 (5): 511–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and Chad K. Clay. 2014. CIRI Human Rights Data Project.
  10. Denny, Kevin. 2011. Civic Returns to Education: Its Effect on Homophobia. 201109. Working Papers. Geary Institute, University College Dublin.Google Scholar
  11. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikae Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39 (5): 615–637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Greene, William H. 2012. Econometric Analysis. 7th ed. Pearson: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  13. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. Right or Robust? The Sensitive Nature of Repression to Globalization. Journal of Peace Research 42 (6): 679–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. American Journal of Sociology 110 (5): 1373–1411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Henderson, Conway W. 1991. Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1): 120–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Hensel, Paul R. 2014. ICOW Colonial History Data Set, Version 1.0.
  17. Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2011. Penn World Table Version 7.0. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices. University of Pennsylvania.Google Scholar
  18. IMF. 2018. IMF Conditionality. IMF. Accessed 6 June 2018.
  19. ———. n.d.-a IMF Members’ Financial Data by Country. Accessed 25 Dec 2012.
  20. ———. n.d.-b Lending by the IMF. Accessed 10 Feb 2017.
  21. Jaccard, James. 2001. Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Jan, Teorell, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko, and Richard Svensson. 2017. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, Version Jan17. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute. Göteborgs Universitet.,
  23. Keefer, Philip. 2012. DPI2012 Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions. Development Research Group, The World Bank.Google Scholar
  24. Kim, Dong-Hun, and Peter F. Trumbore. 2010. Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions: The Impact of FDI on Human Rights, 1981–2006. Journal of Peace Research 47 (6): 723–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2010. Resolution of Banking Crises : The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Working Papers WP/10/146. IMF Working Papers. Washington, DC: IMF.Google Scholar
  26. ———. 2013. Systemic Banking Crises Database. IMF Economic Review 61 (2): 225–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Long, J. Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2014. Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes Using Stata. 3rd ed. College Station: Stata Press.Google Scholar
  28. Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2014. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2016. Dataset User’s Manual. Accessed 21 June 2014.
  29. Meyer, William H. 1996. Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis. Human Rights Quarterly 18 (2): 368–397.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Mitchell, Neil J., and James M. McCormick. 1988. Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations. World Politics 40 (4): 476–498.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Pettersson, Therése, and Peter Wallensteen. 2015. Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014. Journal of Peace Research 52 (4): 536–550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. The American Political Science Review 88 (4): 853–872.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly 43 (2): 291–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  35. Richards, David L., and Ronald D. Gelleny. 2007. Good Things to Those Who Wait? National Elections and Government Respect for Human Rights. Journal of Peace Research 44 (4): 505–523.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Richards, David L., Ronald D. Gelleny, and David H. Sacko. 2001. Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries. International Studies Quarterly 45 (2): 219–239.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Roodman, David. 2011. Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-Process Models with CMP. The Stata Journal 11 (2): 159–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Rudra, Nita. 2004. Openness, Welfare Spending, and Inequality in the Developing World. International Studies Quarterly 48 (3): 683–709.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. UNCTAD. 2015. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Accessed 20 July 2015.
  40. United Nations. 2011. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2011. New York: United Nations.Google Scholar
  41. Vargas, Jose P. Mauricio. 2015. Identifying Binding Constraints to Growth : Does Firm Size Matter? Working Papers WPIEA2015003. IMF Working Papers. Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  42. Williams, Richard. 2006. Generalized Ordered Logit/Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal Dependent Variables. Stata Journal 6 (1): 58–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2010. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rana S. Gautam
    • 1
  1. 1.University of North GeorgiaDahlonegaUSA

Personalised recommendations