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Security of the Blockchain Against Long Delay Attack

  • Puwen WeiEmail author
  • Quan YuanEmail author
  • Yuliang Zheng
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11274)

Abstract

The consensus protocol underlying Bitcoin (the blockchain) works remarkably well in practice. However proving its security in a formal setting has been an elusive goal. A recent analytical result by Pass, Seeman and shelat indicates that an idealized blockchain is indeed secure against attacks in an asynchronous network where messages are maliciously delayed by at most \(\varDelta \ll 1/np\), with n being the number of miners and p the mining hardness. This paper improves upon the result by showing that if appropriate inconsistency tolerance is allowed the blockchain can withstand even more powerful external attacks in the honest miner setting. Specifically we prove that the blockchain is secure against long delay attacks with \(\varDelta \ge 1/np\) in an asynchronous network.

Keywords

Bitcoin Blockchain Delay Random oracle 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of ASIACRYPT 2018 for their insightful and helpful comments. We are also grateful to Siu Ming Yiu, Zhengyu Zhang, Yingnan Deng, Shichen Wu and Xianrui Qin for interesting discussions. Puwen Wei and Quan Yuan were supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61502276 and No. 61572293). Puwen Wei was also supported by the Chinese Major Program of National Cryptography Development Foundation (No. MMJJ2017012) and the Fundamental Research Funds of Shandong University (No. 2016JC029).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information SecurityMinistry of Education, Shandong UniversityJinanChina
  2. 2.University of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

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