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The Problem with Traditional Accident Models to Investigate Patient Safety Incidents in Healthcare

  • Gulsum Kubra KayaEmail author
  • Halime Tuba Canbaz
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Management and Industrial Engineering book series (LNMIE)

Abstract

In healthcare, a number of patients experience incidents, where accident models have been used to understand such incidents. However, it has been often traditional accident models used to understand how incidents might occur and how future incidents can be prevented. While other industries also use traditional accident models and built incident investigation techniques based on the traditional models, such models and techniques have been criticised to be insufficient to understand and investigate incidents in complex systems. This paper provides insight into the understanding of patient safety incidents by highlighting the problems with traditional accident models to investigate patient safety incidents, and gives a number of recommendations. We hope that this paper would trigger further discussions on the fundamental concept of the incident investigations in healthcare.

Keywords

Accident models Incident investigation Patient safety 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EngineeringEngineering Design Centre, Cambridge UniversityCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Department of Histology and EmbryologyNecmettin Erbakan UniversityKonyaTürkiye

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