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Raven Authentication Service

Attacks and Countermeasures
  • Graham RymerEmail author
  • David Llewellyn-Jones
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11286)

Abstract

Raven is the name of the University of Cambridge’s central web authentication service. Many online resources within the University require Raven authentication to protect private data. Individual users are uniquely identified by their Common Registration Scheme identifier (CRSid), and protected online resources refer users to the Raven service for verification of a password. We perform a formal analysis of the proprietary Ucam Webauth protocol and identify a number of practical attacks against the Raven service that uses it. Having considered each vulnerability, we discuss the general principles and lessons that can be learnt to help avoid such vulnerabilities in the future.

Keywords

Web authentication Single-Sign-On Vulnerability Network security 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Malcolm Scott (University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory) for his contribution to the further development of the prototype nginx WAA. We would also like to thank Jon Warbrick, original designer of the Ucam Webauth protocol for many useful discussions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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