Venture Work pp 193-233 | Cite as

Salaried Work in a Financial Economy: Market Risk

  • Alexander Styhre


The fifth chapters summarizes the research findings and points at the implications for management practice, management studies scholarship, and policy-making. Venture work is employment in thinly capitalized firms, in for example, life science ventures, and is likely to represent a growing proportion of employment contracts as the finance industry business logic increasingly determines managerial practice. One such logic is to emphasize return on equity (ROE) as a key performance indicator, thus creating close ties between finance industry actors and non-financial firms. These ties easily translate into co-workers carrying some, if not most, of the market risk once borne by employers. Based on such grounds, the study of venture work is an important feature of the new regime of labor relations. The chapter points at the importance of further scholarly work to better understand how venture work both contributes to innovation-led growth and what costs and benefits this employment model induces and generates for key agents, including employees, employers, and the sovereign state.


Innovation-led growth Industry policy The financialization of the firm 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Styhre
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Business, Economics and LawUniversity of GothenburgGothenburgSweden

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