Venture Work pp 145-191 | Cite as

Interest: The Goal of Reducing Uncertainty

  • Alexander Styhre


This chapter addresses how venture workers construct a concept of economic security as an operational model that they use to monitor their market risk exposure. This risk exposure model includes both economic compensation in terms of monthly salary, but also includes smaller proportions of ownership rights. Despite some of the venture workers holding stock or call options in the life science ventures, such financial holdings are essentially treated as fictive ownership rights, only modestly adding to their motivation to pursue day-to-day work. In contrast, the financial status of the employer is more closely monitored, as an episode of venture capital shortage or even default needs to be moderated by either savings fund buffering the household economy, or the maintaining of smaller household budgets for shorter periods of time. In this view, the shortage of venture capital is an actual and lived experience for venture workers. The second half of the chapter examines how commercial and regulatory know-how is acquired through the venture’s board of directors and/or its venture capital investors. The chapter also addresses the role of state-funded innovation systems agencies and how they are supportive of the development work conducted in the life science ventures.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Styhre
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Business, Economics and LawUniversity of GothenburgGothenburgSweden

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