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Conclusion: Tug-of-War or Benefits for All?

  • Mina Michel Samaan
Chapter

Abstract

This book has been inspired by the dramatic changes occurring in the Nile Basin over the recent years. The study assumed that the water-related events in the basin represent only the tip of the iceberg and that the answer to the above question requires diving deep into the history in order to examine the entire picture portraying the Nile story. Instead of looking at the macro-correlation between causes and consequences of conflict and cooperation in transboundary river basins, the book aimed to closely investigate the process and mechanisms through which the status quo in the Nile Basin has been changing. The research hypothesis states that development on the Nile represents a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, whereby the equilibrium is driven by the changing contexts through their varying influences on the inherited heterogeneities among the different riparian countries.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mina Michel Samaan
    • 1
  1. 1.Braunschweig University of TechnologyBraunschweigGermany

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