Advertisement

Global Development and Climate Change: A Game Theory Approach

  • António Bento CaleiroEmail author
  • Miguel Rocha de Sousa
  • Ingo Andrade de Oliveira
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

The increasing concern with climate change is one of the main issues of our time, and thus we aim to theoretically and mathematically analyse its causes. However our approach follows a different stream of thought, presenting the reasoning and decision-making processes between technical and moral solutions. We have resorted to game theory models in order to demonstrate cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, ranging from the traditional to the evolutionary within game theory. In doing so we are able to glimpse the development of modern society and a paradigm shift regarding human control over nature and to what extent it is harmful to the sustainability of our environment and the survival of future generations. Merging different fields of knowledge, we present a theoretical-philosophical approach, combined with empirical-mathematical solutions taking into account the agent-based behaviour guided blindly by instrumental rationality.

Keywords

Evolutionary game theory Global development Game theory Moral and technical solutions International relations and politics Economics Sustainable development 

JEL Codes

C70 D70 F64 O13 O19 

References

  1. Akerlof, G. A. (1997). Social distance and social decisions. Econometrica, 65, 1005–1027.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Arthur, B. A., Durlauf, S. N., & Lane, D. A. (1997). The economy as an evolving complex system II. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
  3. Assad, E. D., Buainain, A. M., Pinto, H. S., Rocha De Sousa, M., & Duarte, V. S. (2013). Climate change: Challenges for Brazil. In D. Vajpeyi (Ed.), Climate change, sustainable development and international security (Chap. 6) (pp. 169–199). Lanham, MD: Lexington (An imprint of Rowman and Littlefield). isbn:978-0-7391-8146-1 https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780739181461 Google Scholar
  4. Aumann, R. (1959). Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In R. D. Luce & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory 23 of Games IV, Annals of Mathematics Study (Vol. 40, pp. 287–324). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Auerswald, H., Konrad, K. A., & Thum, M. (2011). Adaption, mitigation and risk-taking in climate policy (CESifo Working Paper Series 3320). Munich: CESifo Group.Google Scholar
  6. Binmore, K. (1994). Playing fair: Game theory and the social contract (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  7. Binmore, K. G. (1998). Game theory and the social contract: Just playing (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Buchholz, W., & Sandler, T. (2017). Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches. Environmental and Resource Economics, 67, 591–607.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bull, H. (2002). The anarchical society (3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar
  10. Decanio, S. J., & Fremstad, A. (2013). Game theory and climate diplomacy. Ecological Economics, 85, 177–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Gardiner, S. M. (2006). A perfect moral storm: Climate change, intergenerational ethics and the problem of moral corruption. Environmental Values, 15(3), 397–413.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Goodchild, M. F., Anselin, L., Appelbaum, R. P., & Harthorn, B. H. (2000). Toward spatially integrated social science. International Regional Science Review, 23(2), 139–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative act (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.Google Scholar
  14. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, New Series, 162(3859), 243–253.Google Scholar
  15. Harrington, L. J., Frame, D. J., Fischer, E. M., Hawkins, E., Joshi, M., et al. (2016). Poorest countries experience earlier anthropogenic emergence of daily temperature extremes. Environmental Research Letters, 11(5), 055007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Heal, G. (2017). The economics of the climate. Journal of Economic Literature, 55, 1046–1063.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Howard, N. (1994a). Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution Vs. rational solution. Group Decision and Negotiation, 3, 187–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Howard, N. (1994b). Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process. Group Decision and Negotiation, 3, 207–235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2016). Cooperation and discord in global climate policy. Nature Climate Change, 6, 570–575.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Khun, H. (1953). Extensive games and the problem of information. In H. W. Kuhn, & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. II, pp. 193–216). In H. W. Kuhn (Ed.). (1996). Classics in game theory (pp. 46–68). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Levy, J. K., Hipel, K. W., & Howard, N. (2009a). Advances in drama theory for managing hazards and disasters. Part I: Theoretical foundation. Group Decision Negotiation, 18, 303–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Levy, J. K., Hipel, K. W., & Howard, N. (2009b). Advances in drama theory for managing hazards and disasters. Part II: Coping with global climate change and environmental catastrophe. Group Decision Negotiation, 18, 317–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Nasar, S. (1998). A beautiful mind. London: Faber and Faber.Google Scholar
  24. Nash, J. (1950a). Equilibrium points in n-person games. PNAS: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48–49. In H. W. Khun (Ed.). (1996) Classics in game theory (pp. 3–4). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  25. Nash, J. (1950b). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 155–162. In H. W. Khun (Ed.). (1996) Classics in game theory (pp. 5–13). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  26. Nash, J (1951) Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286–295. In H. W. Khun (Ed.). (1996) Classics in game theory (pp. 14–26). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). A review of the Stern review on the economics of climate change. Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3), 686–702.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy. American Economic Review, 105, 1339–1370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Pittel, K., & Rübbelke, D. T. (2008). Climate policy and ancillary benefits: A survey and integration into the modelling of international negotiations on climate change. Ecological Economics, 68(1), 210–220.Google Scholar
  30. Pittel, K., & Rübbelke, D. T. (2012). Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: from prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 12(1), 23–39.Google Scholar
  31. Robinson, D., & Goforth, D. (2005). The topology of 2x2 games: A new periodic table. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  32. Sachs, J. D. (2015). The age of sustainable development. New York, Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  33. Sachs, J. (2005). The end of poverty: How we can make it happen in our lifetime. London: Penguin.Google Scholar
  34. Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as freedom. Alfred Knopf: New York.Google Scholar
  35. Shapley, L. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn, A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. II, pp. 307–317). In H. W. Kuhn (Ed.). (1996). Classics in game theory (pp. 69–79). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Soroos, M. S. (1994). Global change, environmental security, and the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Peace Research, 31(3), 317–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Stern, N. (2006). Stern review: The economics of climate change (Vol. 30). London: HM treasury.Google Scholar
  38. Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents (Vol. 500). New York: Norton.Google Scholar
  39. The Economist. (2007, September 27). Playing games with the planet. Accessed August 11, 2017, from http://www.economist.com/node/9867020
  40. UNDP. (2017). United Nations Human Development Report, NY.Google Scholar
  41. Vajpeyi, D. K. (Ed.). (2013). Climate change, sustainable development and international security. Lexington (An imprint of Rowman & Littlefield). isbn:978-0-7391-8146-1 https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780739181461
  42. Von Neumann, J. (1928). Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen, 100(1), 295–320.  https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  43. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944)[1994]. The theory of games and economic behavior. 50 th Anniversary Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  44. Weber, M. (1978). In G. Roth & C. Wittich (Eds.), Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  45. Weitzman, M. L. (2007). The Stern review on the economics of climate change. Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3), 703–724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Wilensky, U. (2002). NetLogo PD Basic Evolutionary model. Evanston, IL: Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/PDBasicEvolutionary Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • António Bento Caleiro
    • 1
    Email author
  • Miguel Rocha de Sousa
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Ingo Andrade de Oliveira
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ÉvoraÉvoraPortugal
  2. 2.Research Center in Political Science (CICP)University of ÉvoraÉvoraPortugal
  3. 3.Center for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics (CEFAGE)University of ÉvoraÉvoraPortugal
  4. 4.University of ÉvoraÉvoraPortugal

Personalised recommendations