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Collingwood, Pragmatism, and Philosophy of Science

  • Elena PopaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophers in Depth book series (PID)

Abstract

Popa investigates the relationship between Collingwood’s metaphysics of absolute presuppositions and pragmatism. She notes that pragmatism is a broad church and that while there are family resemblances between Collingwood and philosophers of a pragmatist orientation, there are also some important differences. Collingwood tends to have in common with all pragmatists a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. But unlike classical pragmatists, he does not develop a positive theory of truth: his metaphilosophical strategy is to reject the view that absolute presuppositions are truth-evaluable rather than articulate an alternative conception of truth. Collingwood’s rejection of the correspondence theory of truth does not lead to a full-blown deflationary strategy: rather than seeing philosophical problems as fake problems and advocating the end of philosophy, he sees the role of philosophical analysis to be that of making explicit the absolute presuppositions which inform different causal explanations in different contexts of inquiry.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Asian University for WomenChittagongBangladesh

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