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Malware Deception with Automatic Analysis and Generation of HoneyResource

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
  • Jinpeng Wei
  • Kevin W. Hamlen
  • Cliff Wang
Chapter

Abstract

Malware often contains many system-resource-sensitive condition checks to avoid any duplicate infection, make sure to obtain required resources, or try to infect only targeted computers, etc. If we are able to extract the system resource constraints from malware binary code, and manipulate the environment state as HoneyResource, we would then be able to deceive malware for defense purpose, e.g., immunize a computer from infections, or trick malware into believing something. Towards this end, this chapter introduces our preliminary systematic study and a prototype system, AutoVac, for automatically extracting the system resource constraints from malware code and generating HoneyResource (e.g., malware vaccines) based on the system resource conditions.

Keywords

Malware analysis Malware immunization Malware deception 

Notes

Acknowledgements

An early version of this chapter appeared in ICDCS’13 [31] . This research is partially supported by NSF (Grant No. CNS-0954096), AFOSR (Grant No. FA9550- 13-1-0077), and DARPA (Grant No. 12011593). All opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF, AFOSR, or DARPA.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ehab Al-Shaer
    • 1
  • Jinpeng Wei
    • 2
  • Kevin W. Hamlen
    • 3
  • Cliff Wang
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Software & Information SystemUniversity of North Carolina CharlotteCharlotteUSA
  2. 2.Department of Software and Information SystemUniversity of North CarolinaCharlotteUSA
  3. 3.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of Texas at DallasRichardsonUSA
  4. 4.Computing and Information Science DivisionArmy Research OfficeDurhamUSA

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