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The Chewa Logical Concept of Truth

  • Grivas Muchineripi Kayange
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 135)

Abstract

This chapter investigates the Chewa concept of truth through a reflection on the relation between statements and reality/facts. It argues that the Chewa people have a logical concept of truth, which is dependent on the relation between statements and reality, and the requirement of observation. It is argued that for a sentence to be true, it must correspond to facts, and there must be ontological commitment supporting this relation.

Keywords

Truth Evidence Ordinary language approach African philosophy Correspondence theory Observation Ontological commitment 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grivas Muchineripi Kayange
    • 1
  1. 1.Chancellor CollegeUniversity of MalawiZombaMalawi

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